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DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo (3127)	Colin Powell to Chief of Staff re agenda and talking points for White House Summit Group meeting, 1p R 5/24/11 F97-066/6 #182	4/26/88	B1
2. talking points	for H. Baker, 1p R " " #183	n.d.	B1
3. list	re suggested public diplomacy events, 1p R " " #184	n.d.	B1
4. report	Toronto Summit Economic Objectives, 4p R 3/17/06 F97-066/6 #185	4/26/88	B1
5. memo (2951)	Powell to Chief of Staff re preparations for Toronto summit, 2p R 5/24/11 F97-066/6 #186	4/20/88	B1
6. memo	James Baker to White House Summit Group re economic priorities for Toronto Summit, 2p R 2/8/88 F97-066/6 #187	4/12/88	B1
7. memo	Allen Wallis to H. Baker and C. Powell re report of the second preparatory meeting, 1p R 3/17/06 F97-066/6 #188	3/21/88	B1
8. report	re discussions for the second preparatory meeting for the Toronto Summit, 7p R " " #189	n.d.	B1
9. report	undated copy of item 4, 4p R " " #190	n.d.	B1
10. memo (90121)	Stephen Danzansky to H. Baker and C. Powell re first meeting of the White House Summit Group (w/notations), 5p R 5/24/11 F97-066/6 #191	2/4/88	B1
11. list	Key Elements of Proposed Response to Mulroney, 1p R " " #192	n.d.	B1
12. talking points	for H. Baker, 2p R " " #193	2/11/88	B1

RESTRICTIONS

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 26, 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

FROM: COLIN L. POWELL 
SUBJECT: Agenda and Talking Points for White House Summit
Group Meeting, 4:30 PM, April 26

While most White House attention is focused, naturally, on the Moscow Summit, it is important to ensure that preparations for the Toronto Economic Summit are on track. Jim Baker discussed the Economic Summit with Prime Minister Mulroney in Ottawa April 21; Mulroney will raise Toronto in his meetings this week in Washington.

At tomorrow's meeting, I suggest you and I make introductory remarks. Jim Baker will then review the economic objectives for Toronto, issues the President will have to weigh in on and the next steps in the preparatory process. Allen Wallis can review where we stand on format/structure issues and George Shultz will review the political issues. After Shultz's remarks I would like to discuss briefly whether the President should raise the issue of burdensharing at Toronto.

We need to review our public diplomacy strategy for Toronto. Tab C has suggestions for public diplomacy events. We will not have much time after Moscow to get our Toronto message out. Steve Danzansky is prepared to speak to this subject. We will want to get Tom Griscom's advice on how to proceed.

A final item concerns briefings for the President. We envision four separate sessions, three covering economic issues and one political issues. Steve Danzansky will cover this issue.

Suggested talking points for your use are at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A	Talking Points
Tab B	Agenda
Tab C	Public Diplomacy Events

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BY RW NARA DATE 5/1/01

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Talking Points for Howard Baker

- We should not let the preoccupation with the Moscow Summit cause us to lose sight of the Toronto Economic Summit. It is just two weeks after our return from Moscow. Both meetings are very important for the President.
- The President wants substantive results at Toronto, particularly in agriculture and trade. We need to lay the groundwork carefully, at home and at the OECD Ministerial in mid-May. Brian Mulroney will want to hear our views tomorrow and Thursday.
- I would like Jim Baker to review where we are on the economic objectives and where we should ask the President to focus his efforts.
- George, then you could tell us what political issues to expect.
- I will also want to hear views on our public diplomacy strategy.
- Before you begin, Jim, Colin has a few words.

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BY RW NARA DATE 5/24/11

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CPB NARA, Date 8/24/04

White House Summit Group Meeting
Tuesday, April 26, 1988

Agenda

- I. Introduction.....Howard Baker/Colin Powell
- II. Economic Report.....James Baker
 - o Economic Objectives
 - o President's Agenda
 - o Next Steps
- III. Toronto Format.....Allen Wallis
- IV. Political Report.....George Shultz
- V. Public Diplomacy and Presidential Briefings.....Stephen Danzansky
- VI. Conclusions.....Howard Baker

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Toronto Economic Summit
Suggested Public Diplomacy Events

June

- 6 In World Gas Conference speech (Moscow read-out), President should note Toronto as next major event and summarize U.S. objectives
- 9 Principal pre-Toronto address identifying themes President will stress. Commencement address would be good forum.
- 11 Saturday radio address on economic themes
- 13 [Powell address to Atlantic Council]
- 16 Worldnet address to Europe and Japan
- 18 Pre-departure radio address on Toronto
- 22 Post-Summit read-out to Business Roundtable

Above events would be supplemented by Treasury/State/USTR/Agriculture briefings at Foreign Press Center and by speaking engagements of Shultz/Baker/Yeutter/Lyng.

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NLRR F97-0610 #124
BY RW NARA DATE 5/24/

4/30/02

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TORONTO SUMMIT ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES

1. SETTING

The Toronto Economic Summit will be the President's eighth and last. While there will be a legitimate desire to review the accomplishments of past Summits, this must be done in the context of outlining the economic challenges which remain. The President's colleagues will have forward-looking agendas and will want results from Toronto. For this, they will need the President's leadership.

The President, too, can and should press a forward-looking agenda. Financial markets will look to the Toronto discussions for confirmation that the Summit Seven are maintaining policies aimed at sustaining global economic prosperity.

Although the substantive issues are unlikely to be new -- economic coordination, structural adjustment, debt, trade, and agriculture -- the discussions will have to go beyond those of previous Summits. Heads should assess where we are on each of these issues, where they would like to be by their next meeting and what needs to be done in the interval. The economic situation at the time of Toronto will, of course, affect how these issues are presented.

Prime Minister Mulroney's proposal to add an informal session on long-term economic issues gives us the opportunity to raise issues which may not be ripe for inclusion in the communique.

The United States can use the preparations for Toronto to streamline the Summit itself and highlight the economic discussions. The communique should reflect concisely the discussion among Heads. Subjects which are not discussed, such as was the case with AIDS and bio-ethics at Venice, should not be included.

Issues the United States will want to raise at Toronto include:

(A) Economic Policy Coordination

A key U.S. objective will be strengthening the arrangements for international economic policy coordination agreed upon at

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the Tokyo and Venice Summits. We will want to assure that surplus countries (particularly Germany and Japan) continue to follow through on efforts to improve growth and reduce external imbalances. We will need to address demands that the United States reduce its budget deficit and stand ready to take financial measures to support the dollar if necessary.

This year we will want to continue the momentum for strengthening economic policy coordination by endorsing:

- the new commodity price indicator proposed by Secretary Baker; and
- commitments to undertake policies aimed at structural change -- particularly in financial, labor, and agricultural markets; industrial subsidies; and regulated industries such as telecommunications and transportation.

Since little scope exists for additional macroeconomic policy efforts this year, economic attention should shift to removing policy and regulatory barriers which impede growth and adjustment. These microeconomic policies will receive attention at this year's OECD Ministerial. The G-7 Finance Ministers have been working to increase attention on the benefits from removing structural rigidities through the economic policy coordination process. Political direction by Heads to include these issues in G-7 Ministerial reviews will give additional support to ongoing work in the OECD and elsewhere.

(B) International Debt

- Reaffirm Summit support for the strengthened debt strategy and welcome progress that has been made since Venice, both bilaterally and through the Paris Club;
- Underscore the importance and further development of the menu approach and its emphasis on voluntary market-oriented alternatives for providing financial support;
- Oppose global debt solutions and taxpayer assumption of LDC debt;
- Emphasize the need for continued assistance to the low-income countries through enhanced support from

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both the Summit countries and the international financial institutions.

(C) International Trade

The United States should seek:

- Summit endorsement of a substantial outcome at the midterm review of the Uruguay Round, particularly in agriculture, services, intellectual property and the functioning of the GATT system;
- Reaffirm opposition to protectionist trade measures and commitment to standstill;
- Seek an informed discussion of the role of NIC's in the world economy and ways these economies can contribute responsibly to sustaining global prosperity.

(D) Agriculture

The United States should seek Summit endorsement of:

- A market-oriented approach to the GATT negotiations, in line with the United States proposal to phase out trade distorting government subsidies and import barriers;
- Completing, by the mid-term review, a framework agreement that will establish long-term goals for a fundamental reform of world agriculture and provide the basis for the more detailed negotiations to follow.

(E) Other Topics

Topics we should be prepared to discuss include:

- East-West economic relations and implications for allied security.
- Economic consequences and sustainability of social welfare systems.
- Policy implications of October 1987 financial market developments.

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- "Shared responsibilities" in the economic/defense/aid areas.
- Relationships with the NIC's.

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By CCB NARA, Date 8/24/04

White House Summit Group Meeting
Tuesday, April 26, 1988

Agenda

- I. Introduction.....Howard Baker/Colin Powell
- II. Economic Report.....James Baker
 - o Economic Objectives
 - o President's Agenda
 - o Next Steps
- III. Toronto Format.....Allen Wallis
- IV. Political Report.....George Shultz
- V. Public Diplomacy and Presidential Briefings.....Stephen Danzansky
- VI. Conclusions.....Howard Baker

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 20, 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

FROM: COLIN L. POWELL 
SUBJECT: Preparations for the Toronto Economic Summit

During Prime Minister Mulroney's April 27-28 visit to Washington, he will wish to discuss the Toronto Economic Summit with the President and Secretaries Shultz and Baker.

I propose that the White House Summit Group (WHSG) meet Tuesday, April 26, to review preparations for the Toronto Summit. April 26 appears to be the only time we can get the WHSG principals together prior to Prime Minister Mulroney's visit. The following items need to be discussed by the WHSG:

- Economic objectives for Toronto;
- Public diplomacy themes;
- Issues to raise with Mulroney.

Secretary Baker has identified, in a memo to the WHSG, his priorities for Toronto (Tab A). They are:

- Strengthening multilateral surveillance process, with increased attention to reviewing structural barriers to growth and job creation;
- Reaffirmation of case-by-case debt strategy;
- Agriculture;
- Trade, including discussing role of NICs and getting support for FTA.

Secretary Baker has also mentioned an interest in discussing "burden sharing" in the economic/defense/aid areas, although it is not clear how he wishes to treat the subject. Secretary Shultz may have other thoughts.

The Sherpa team has prepared an economic objectives paper (Tab B). It is being reviewed by Secretary Baker who will speak to it at the WHSG meeting.

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BY RW NARA DATE 5/24

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Prime Minister Mulroney doubtlessly will raise Toronto in general terms with the President April 27. He will have an opportunity for a more detailed discussion when he sees Secretaries Shultz and Baker on April 28. These two meetings provide us with an excellent opportunity to get our views across to Mulroney.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the White House Summit Group meet on Tuesday, April 26.

Approve 7/13 Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab A	Secretary Baker's Memo on Economic Priorities for Toronto Summit
Tab B	Objectives Paper

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THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

WASHINGTON

April 12, 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR WHITE HOUSE SUMMIT GROUP

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB*
SUBJECT: Economic Priorities for Toronto Summit

Allen Wallis' report (attached) on the La Sapiniere preparatory meeting is encouraging; we are making progress in re-emphasizing economic issues for the Toronto Summit.

Our first priority on economic issues should be to strengthen the multilateral surveillance process set out at the Tokyo Summit. We need to move forward on the economic indicator system and provide concrete evidence that the policy coordination process addresses all aspects of economic issues -- macro and structural policies -- in a consistent, reinforcing manner. We will want to secure Heads of State or Government endorsement of placing the responsibility of coordinating these policy efforts with Finance Ministers.

Within that framework my own view is that while we will want to maintain pressure on others to follow through on the macro policy commitments already made, it would be counterproductive to press for additional macro policy efforts at the Summit.

In our Finance Ministers' meetings we have, since the Plaza Agreement, been placing increased attention on the need for reviewing structural barriers to growth and job creation. I will be discussing the need for structural change in agricultural, labor, financial, and goods markets at our forthcoming G-7 Ministers' multilateral surveillance meeting to ascertain which of these issues can be discussed fruitfully by the Heads of State.

Our second priority should be to reaffirm the debt strategy. As calls for a centralized debt facility rise, we need to defend more actively the appropriateness and flexibility of our case-by-case approach.

Our success on trade and agricultural issues for the early harvest this winter will, of course, depend largely on the OECD Ministerial and Quad discussions, but will benefit importantly from support of Heads of State in Toronto.

Another priority is the need to focus on ways to broaden our efforts to influence the NICs without engaging in fruitless debates over the proper forum for discussion. While progress has been made through our bilateral efforts with the Asian NICs, it would be helpful to secure support by the Heads of State at Toronto.

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BY LTI NARA, DATE 2/8/08

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Finally, I hope that we can obtain support for the U.S.-Canadian FTA in the Summit Communique.

I look forward to our discussion of these and other economic issues for the Summit at our meeting.

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By CLB NARA, Date 8/24/04

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Toronto Economic Summit
Tentative Schedule

Sunday, June 19

9:30AM Official Welcoming Ceremony begins, Toronto City Hall (Reverse protocol order)

3:00PM First Session (Economics) - MTCC

Heads, Foreign and Finance Ministers meet separately

7:00PM Dinners:

Heads at Royal Canadian Yacht Club
Foreign Ministers at Toronto Hunt Club
Finance Ministers at Old Mill

Monday, June 20

9:30AM Plenary Session (Economics)

12:30PM Lunches:

Heads and Foreign Ministers at l'Hotel (MTCC)
Finance Ministers at l'Hotel (MTCC)

3:30PM Plenary Session (Economics)

TBA Heads Unstructured Discussion - Hart House, Univ. Toronto

7:00PM Separate Dinners at Hart House

Tuesday, June 21

9:30AM Plenary - Communique Review

1:00PM Governor General's luncheon - Art Gallery of Toronto

4:00PM Communique Reading - Roy Thomson Hall

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UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON

March 21, 1988

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOWARD BAKER
AND GEN. COLIN POWELL
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Toronto Economic Summit: Report of the Second
Preparatory Meeting, February 27-29, 1988

Attached is my report of the meeting of Personal Representatives and Sherpa Team members February 27-29 in Val David, Quebec to prepare for the 1988 Toronto Economic Summit. The meeting dealt with substantive issues that could be discussed at the Summit, and issues of format and organization.

There is general consensus in favor of the format changes proposed by the Canadians: an earlier start with a Heads-only session on economic topics, and an "unstructured session" on new issues the second afternoon. These changes should serve to increase the emphasis on economic subjects and foster more informality.

The development of economic topics for Summit discussion is at an early stage. Nevertheless, it appears the main topics at the Toronto Economic Summit will include those of years past -- agriculture, policy coordination, debt, structural reform and trade -- as well as other subjects which would be new to Economic Summits. The new subjects could include how to deal with the newly industrializing countries, the problems of an aging population, or change in East-West economic relations.

We will continue to be vigilant to ensure that the preparatory process does not result in a pre-negotiated communique which either constrains discussion by Heads or is at variance with what the Heads actually discuss.


Allen Wallis

Attachment: As stated

cc: Treasury - Mr. Mulford
NSCS - Mr. Danzansky

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NLS F97-066/6-#188
BY LOI, NARA, DATE 3/17/06

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Report of Discussions
Second Preparatory Meeting for the Toronto Summit
La Sapiniere, Quebec
February 27-29, 1988

Summary: On macroeconomic policy, the Sherpas felt the tone of the discussion paper was too negative. They wished to emphasize the positive results so far of adjustment, while highlighting the policies needed to continue the process. The G-7 would be discussing possible commodity prices indices, and the matter could be raised at the next Sherpa meeting. Exchange rates discussion was inconclusive, and the Canadian paper is to be revised. For the next meeting the Sherpas also agreed to look into: a) the relationship between savings and investment; b) labor market flexibility; and c) security market regulation.

The trade, exchange rate and investment policies of the newly industrializing countries were seen to be distorting current account balances. Some felt that a role for the NICs might be found at the OECD; others disagreed. How to deal with the NICs is likely to be a Summit topic. The Sherpas agreed that the problem needs more analysis; that improved dialogue was appealing; and that the NICs should take on more responsibility at the GATT.

Sherpas agreed that microeconomic policy (structural reform) would receive heightened emphasis. There was consideration of whether surveillance or transparency could be applied to structural rigidities, and it was agreed that the developing world also could do more.

All stressed the importance of the Uruguay Round and the "standstill" on protectionism. There was a wide divergence on the role and function of the mid-term review. The U.S. and Canada advocated having the Summit give specific guidance to the review; the Europeans disagreed. Similar views applied to agricultural reform, with the U.S. and Canada insisting on progress on agriculture at the mid-term review and the EC countries resisting, claiming that they deserved credit for CAP "reforms."

Sherpas agreed that the debt picture was considerably better than perceived, and that the Heads ought to reiterate their commitment to a steady course. Calls for global solutions or government bailouts should be firmly resisted. Ways should be found to highlight the role of the Paris Club in ameliorating debt burdens. France and Britain would like to stimulate discussion of concessional interest rates (the Lawson proposal) for the poorest nations; Canada was concerned at the political fall-out of any possible disagreement.

Canadian proposals for the structure of the Summit meetings were approved. These include an earlier start with an economics discussion and addition of an informal Heads-only session on June 20, just before dinner. The informal session probably would focus on long-range economic challenges. The Canadians announced tentative plans for briefings after each session. End Summary

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BY ML NARA, DATE 3/17/06

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The second preparatory meeting for the Toronto Economic Summit was held February 27-29 at Hotel La Sapiniere in Val David, Quebec. Representing the U.S. were Allen Wallis, David Mulford and Stephen Danzansky.

The discussion covered substantive issues which might come up at Toronto as well as the structure of the meetings. The Canadians had distributed an issues paper prior to the meeting. A report of the La Sapiniere discussion follows.

I. Macroeconomic

It was generally felt with minor exceptions (Italy and the EC) that the overall tone of the Canadian discussion paper was too pessimistic if that tone were to become the overture of the June Summit. In fact, there was a good deal of optimism around the room that the doomsayers were indeed wrong, that growth would continue, that the debt problem would continue to be managed and that the macroeconomic adjustments would continue to take place in an orderly way with low inflation and continued, though possibly slower, growth. The participants recognized that the huge and potentially disastrous shock of October 19, 1987 had been weathered through extensive cooperation of the Summit Seven nations.

The main macroeconomic issue for the Summit was the question of continuing to manage the transition (adjustment) from the current account imbalances of the past couple of years to sustainable payments balances in the context of continued non-inflationary growth.

In that context it was felt that:

-- The Summit should clearly state the progress achieved to date on the process of economic coordination. There is a positive story to tell on that issue, and the Summit should not hesitate to do so.

-- There should also be a full discussion of the adjustment of imbalances achieved by the Summit Seven thus far, and policies need to continue this process.

-- Global indicators: The suggestion made at the September 1987 IMF/World Bank Annual Meetings regarding possible use of a commodity price index as a leading indicator of inflationary trends -- and the value of such an indicator as a guide to discussion among countries on policies that individual countries should adopt -- needs further development. That subject will be further discussed among the G-7 and could be raised at the next Sherpa meeting.

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-- Exchange Rates: The discussion concerning the importance, stability, level and effect of exchange rate adjustments and their relationship to interest rates and account imbalances was inconclusive. It was felt that the discussion paper upon which the Sherpa exchange was based was not acceptable in its current form and needed to be revised.

-- Savings and Investment: The Sherpas agreed to look further into the relationship between savings rates and investment, particularly in light of the large differentials in savings rates within the largest industrialized countries (Japan and U.S.). As domestic demand in the U.S. seems to be leveling off, fourth quarter figures indicate an increase in savings. Japanese figures are not yet available. It was agreed that this question needs further study and review by the Sherpas before anything definitive can be decided regarding Summit discussion.

-- Employment: It was agreed that questions of labor market flexibility, high European unemployment and the increase and quality of U.S. employment had not been adequately addressed either in the paper or among the Sherpas. Further discussion was planned at subsequent meetings.

-- Responsibility for Policy Adjustment: It was agreed that responsibility for economic policy adjustment and cooperation extends beyond the three largest industrialized economies to other European economies and to the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) as well.

-- Security Market Regulation: There was a brief discussion of international security market regulation and harmonization in light of the events of October 19. It was decided that the Sherpas would carefully follow the results of the OECD Working Party III (WP-3) which is addressing these issues and judge later whether there should be a reference in the Summit Communique.

II. The Newly Industrialized Nations

There was extensive discussion among the Sherpas on the role (and responsibility) of the NICs in the international economic system. There was a general feeling that the NICs, with their propensities for exchange rate, trade and investment protection, were distorting current account balances in the industrialized world and that something needed to be done. The first question is one of definition both of the NICs and of the distortions created. The Venice Summit Communique mentioned the increased need for NIC responsibility in reducing trade barriers and allowing currency adjustments. The OECD has undertaken some work on the subject. Some Sherpas suggested a role for the NICs at the OECD as a means of "educating" them into harmony with the industrialized nations. Others indicated that the NICs cannot be treated as a homogeneous group but rather on a case-by-case basis. Others mused that the NICs (particularly the Pacific NICs) were a U.S. problem and

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should be dealt with by the U.S., particularly on exchange rate problems. In summary, there seemed to be a sense that the matter of NICs would need to be dealt with in some depth at the Summit, but there was little agreement as to just what would be discussed or proposed. All that was agreed was:

-- The NIC problem needs more analysis, possibly within the OECD.

-- The notion of improved dialogue with the NICs was appealing, as was the notion of talking the NICs into better balance; however, there was no consensus on how to accomplish this, whether through a Junior OECD (Italian suggestion) or through the Pacific Economic Forum. In any event, it was agreed that an adequate analysis should precede any dialogue.

-- The role of the NICs at the GATT ought to involve increased responsibility but should be left up to the Uruguay Round negotiations.

III. Microeconomic Policy

-- It was agreed that because there was apparently so little room for maneuvering on macroeconomic issues among the Summit Seven, other than restatements of prior commitments and notation of progress, structural adjustment likely would become of heightened importance in Toronto. The Summit preparatory process should therefore be proportionately focused on this issue.

-- The Sherpas were unclear, however, as to just where to focus attention. The notion of creating some better means of surveillance or transparency into the structural rigidities of Summit (and non-summit) nations was briefly discussed.

-- It was agreed that the Sherpas should return to this issue to see if more meat can be placed on the skeleton.

-- It was also agreed that the developing world needs to do more in the area of adjustment.

IV. Trade

-- The importance of the Uruguay Round was stressed, especially the call for standstill on protectionism. It was keenly felt that an "overt move" toward protectionism (i.e., the U.S. Congress) could easily destroy the Round.

-- There was an extreme divergence of views concerning the role and function of the mid-term review now scheduled for December 5, 1988 in Montreal:

o Some (the U.S. and Canada) felt that the mid-term review could only be credible and a defense against unilateral protectionism if the Summit gives specific

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directions as to what the review should include. An analogy was made to the Tokyo Summit declaration of support to the launching of the new round in the fall of 1986 and a specific mention of certain topics for negotiation, i.e., services, intellectual property, investment, etc. It was also thought that a Summit signal of the expectation of progress at the mid-term review could assist in shaping U.S. political party platforms and convention outcomes.

o Other countries (European nations and the EC) insisted that the Summit should not "preview" the mid-term "review"; that the GATT had jurisdiction over the Round and should be allowed to determine the scope and composition of the mid-term review without Summit Seven instructions. Any effort of the Summit to produce specificity could erode the opportunity for progress in the GATT. Specificity would be counterproductive in Geneva.

-- There was also considerable discussion and disagreement on the matter of agricultural reform, both as to the pace of negotiations in the new round (i.e., candidacy of agriculture for mid-term review) and as to the bona fides of the Summit Seven in following the Venice Summit undertaking for standstill and rollback. The EC was clearly enamored with the progress it claims to have made in terms of "reforming" the CAP and wanted credit for same in Toronto. The U.S. and Canada congratulated the EC only on managing to save itself from bankruptcy and opposed credit at the Summit for short-term measures unless coupled with a commitment to long-term phase out of distortions (subsidies).

-- It was decided to revisit the agriculture issue following the OECD May 18-19 Ministerial at which time two reports would be issued concerning agriculture, and the GATT would have had additional time to compare proposals for reform put forward by the U.S., EC, Cairns Group and others.

V. Debt

-- It was agreed that the debt picture was considerably better than perceived and, in this area, as in the macroeconomic area, a good deal of misinformation or disinformation was afloat. It was also agreed that the Summit must reiterate its commitment to pursue a consistent course.

-- The main focus of the problem in the next few months will be Brazil and Argentina. Brazil had come to the realization that its efforts at moratorium were counterproductive and self-defeating; but the Brazil negotiations were still likely to be difficult. Argentina would need assistance and considerable reform to begin to make headway toward economic health.

-- There will be increasing calls for global solutions and for taxpayer assumption of LDC debt and commercial bank bailouts.

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The Summit must steadfastly resist same by strongly reinforcing the present course with due flexibility in developing market-oriented menu options for consideration. The Mexican zero-coupon bond program should be watched in the months ahead and variations developed.

-- The Summit must wrestle with the general lack of understanding of the role of creditor governments in the matter of official debt. It must highlight the contributions made in the Paris Club and bilaterally toward the amelioration of debt burdens.

-- As to the poorest of the poor debtors (mainly sub-Saharan Africa), there was some disagreement as to how best to deal with them in the Summit context. France and Britain would like the Summit to deal with or discuss the matter of concessional interest rates as set forth in the Lawson proposal. Canada expressed political concern about Summit disagreement on the matter of providing more debt reduction and interest rate reduction flexibility in dealing with the poorest of the poor.

-- The U.S. position is that concessional financing of public debt is impossible for legal, fiscal and political reasons.

-- It was agreed that more work needed to be done on the possibility of targeting ODA resources on the poorest nations.

-- It was also agreed that on the trade side, more had to be done for the poorest nations by way of concessions and special and differential treatment.

VI. Procedural Issues

Structure

The Canadians wish to give greater focus to economics at the Toronto Summit. Accordingly, they have proposed to modify the traditional Summit format by starting the economics discussion the afternoon of June 19 and adding an informal session of Heads alone on June 20 prior to dinner. The informal session probably would focus on long-range economic challenges facing the Summit countries.

Margaret Thatcher initially resisted starting earlier but she has now agreed. Hence all countries have accepted the Canadian proposal which is outlined at Tab A.

Traditionally, meals at the Summit have been working sessions and restricted to Summit participants. Finance Minister Wilson is considering inviting up to 80 Canadian businessmen to the June 19 dinner he will host for Finance Ministers. External Affairs Minister Clark may be considering a similar idea for his June 19 dinner for Foreign Ministers. While the U.S. has told the

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Canadians that it is their Summit and they should do as they please, other countries have told the Canadians that the expanded dinners were a bad idea.

In addition, the Canadians are considering regular briefings by designated spokesmen after each session. This would be a departure from practice but is designed to give the media some economic news to focus on during the three-day meeting. The Canadian media proposal (Tab B) has not yet been tabled formally.

Next Sherpa meeting:

The next preparatory meeting will take place May 19-21 in Paris immediately following the May 18-19 OECD Ministerial.

Attachments

Tab A	Tentative Schedule for Toronto Economic Summit
Tab B	Canada's Proposed Media Plan

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DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By COB NARA, Date 8/24/04

Canada's Proposed Media Plan
Toronto Economic Summit

Sunday, June 19

PM Press briefing after Heads' session on Economics
TBD: Briefer (Clark/Wilson) and how (on/off record)

Monday, June 20

AM Clark briefing on Foreign Ministers' June 19 dinner if
no political statement is issued at noon.

Noon Wilson briefing on morning's plenary Economics session
Clark briefing on political statement (if there is one)

PM Wilson briefing on afternoon's plenary Economics
session

Tuesday, June 21

4:00PM Communique reading

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TORONTO SUMMIT ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES

1. SETTING

The Toronto Economic Summit will be the President's eighth and last. While there will be a legitimate desire to review the accomplishments of past Summits, this must be done in the context of outlining the economic challenges which remain. The President's colleagues will have forward-looking agendas and will want results from Toronto. For this, they will need the President's leadership.

The President, too, can and should press a forward-looking agenda. Financial markets will look to the Toronto discussions for confirmation that the Summit Seven are maintaining policies aimed at sustaining global economic prosperity.

Although the substantive issues are unlikely to be new -- economic coordination, structural adjustment, debt, trade, and agriculture -- the discussions will have to go beyond those of previous Summits. Heads should assess where we are on each of these issues, where they would like to be by their next meeting and what needs to be done in the interval. The economic situation at the time of Toronto will, of course, affect how these issues are presented.

Prime Minister Mulroney's proposal to add an informal session on long-term economic issues gives us the opportunity to raise issues which may not be ripe for inclusion in the communique.

The United States can use the preparations for Toronto to streamline the Summit itself and highlight the economic discussions. The communique should reflect concisely the discussion among Heads. Subjects which are not discussed, such as was the case with AIDS and bio-ethics at Venice, should not be included.

Issues the United States will want to raise at Toronto include:

(A) Economic Policy Coordination

A key U.S. objective will be strengthening the arrangements for international economic policy coordination agreed upon at

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BY WOT NADA, DATE 3/17/06

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the Tokyo and Venice Summits. We will want to assure that surplus countries (particularly Germany and Japan) continue to follow through on efforts to improve growth and reduce external imbalances. We will need to address demands that the United States reduce its budget deficit and stand ready to take financial measures to support the dollar if necessary.

This year we will want to continue the momentum for strengthening economic policy coordination by endorsing:

- the new commodity price indicator proposed by Secretary Baker; and
- commitments to undertake policies aimed at structural change -- particularly in financial, labor, and agricultural markets; industrial subsidies; and regulated industries such as telecommunications and transportation.

Since little scope exists for additional macroeconomic policy efforts this year, economic attention should shift to removing policy and regulatory barriers which impede growth and adjustment. These microeconomic policies will receive attention at this year's OECD Ministerial. The G-7 Finance Ministers have been working to increase attention on the benefits from removing structural rigidities through the economic policy coordination process. Political direction by Heads to include these issues in G-7 Ministerial reviews will give additional support to ongoing work in the OECD and elsewhere.

(B) International Debt

- Reaffirm Summit support for the strengthened debt strategy and welcome progress that has been made since Venice, both bilaterally and through the Paris Club;
- Underscore the importance and further development of the menu approach and its emphasis on a negotiated, market-oriented way of both resolving debt problems and facilitating new financial flows;
- Point out weakness of global debt solutions and taxpayer assumption of LDC debt;
- Emphasize the need for continued assistance to the low-income countries through enhanced support from

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-3-

both the Summit countries and the international financial institutions.

(C) International Trade

The United States should seek:

- Summit endorsement of a substantial outcome at the midterm review of the Uruguay Round, particularly in agriculture, services, intellectual property and the functioning of the GATT system;
- Reaffirm opposition to protectionist trade measures and commitment to standstill;
- Seek an informed discussion of the role of NIC's in the world economy and ways these economies can contribute responsibly to sustaining global prosperity.

(D) Agriculture

The United States should seek Summit endorsement of:

- A market-oriented approach to the GATT negotiations, in line with the United States proposal to phase out trade distorting government subsidies and import barriers;
- Completing, by the mid-term review, a framework agreement that will establish long-term goals for a fundamental reform of world agriculture and provide the basis for the more detailed negotiations to follow.

(E) Other Topics

Topics we should be prepared to discuss include:

- East-West economic relations and implications for allied security.
- Economic consequences and sustainability of social welfare systems.
- Policy implications of October 1987 financial market developments.

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-4-

- "Shared responsibilities" in the economic/defense/aid areas.
- Relationships with the NIC's.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SYSTEM II
90121

Feb. 11
2:45p

February 4, 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR HOWARD H. BAKER, JR.
COLIN L. POWELL

FROM: STEPHEN I. DANZANSKY

SUBJECT: First Meeting of White House Summit Group (WHSG)
on the Toronto Economic Summit

This meeting should focus on organization, both USG internal and the Summit itself.

I. USG Organization

The NSDD signed by the President on January 20, 1988 (Tab 1) establishes the WHSG as the principal coordinating mechanism both for policy and procedure. Allen Wallis, Steve Danzansky and David Mulford are reappointed as Sherpas, but as previously discussed, the NSDD specifies a change in lines of authority. By the addition of Secretaries Shultz and Baker, the WHSG becomes something more than a logistical command center for the trip; it is the principal policy body for USG positions and agreements at the Summit. By the terms of the NSDD the WHSG delegates to Secretary Baker the authority to coordinate all economic policy questions, including Summit preparation. Likewise, Secretary Shultz has primary responsibility on foreign policy issues.

This means the Sherpas will work through and report to Secretary Baker on economics and to Secretary Shultz on foreign policy. The Cabinet officers will, in turn, be responsible to the WHSG. At the Summit, therefore, after the President, Secretary Shultz would be the sole spokesman on foreign policy questions and Baker on economic questions. Hopefully, this change will clarify lines of authority and avert the policy confusion which we experienced at Venice. It must therefore be made clear to Allen Wallis that he is to report to and be guided by the WHSG.

II. Summit Organization: Success in Toronto

Prime Minister Mulroney has written to each of the heads of state asking for their ideas on how to improve the functioning and effectiveness of the Economic Summit. Canadian officials tell us Mulroney will carefully weigh our response both in deference to the President's wishes and out of a keenly felt (by Mulroney) desire for reform of the Summit process.

Mulroney wishes to encourage as much informality as possible. He proposes more emphasis on economics than has been the case at

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BY RW NARA DATE 5/24/11

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recent Summits, suggesting that Foreign and Finance Ministers should join in the economics discussions. However, he also suggests more time for Heads, meeting alone, to have an unstructured discussion of major Summit issues. Accordingly, he proposes beginning the Summit with an afternoon session rather than the traditional evening dinner. Mulroney used a retreat format when he hosted the Francophone and Commonwealth Summits and has broached the same idea for Toronto.

Over the past few years, the bureaucratization of Economic Summits has resulted in the evolution of three distinct processes. That was not the case in the beginning when the "Sherpas" were actually the Finance Ministers (Giscard d'Estaing, Helmut Schmidt, George Shultz) and had full authority for both preparation and policy. It was they who set the agenda, prepared their leaders and negotiated and wrote the communique. Today, however, we (in effect) must manage three Summits:

-- The Summit-of-the-meeting-of-Heads-of-State. This Summit involves the personal exchanges and actual discussions between the Heads. Sometimes they are fruitful, at other times mundane, and occasionally, divisive. President Reagan has found these sessions to be quite useful, particularly when the discussions were less structured and more free-wheeling.

-- The Summit-of-the-communique. The Summit communique has become a highly technical document, negotiated by the Sherpas over several months. The language is carefully drafted with meticulous attention paid to nuances and macroeconomic definitions. The communique is read by few and understood by an even smaller group of elite journalists, economists and political scientists.

-- The Summit-of-media perception. This is the Summit of images, drama, success or failure, black and white solutions and 30 second sound bites. U.S. management of the media Summit has ranged from very good to very poor with corresponding consequences for Presidential credibility and U.S. leadership.

The addition of "political" issues to the Summit agenda in 1979-1980 has created yet another crosscurrent of issues and processes, a fourth Summit, if you will. While we have done well in accomplishing our political agenda (terrorism, East-West statements, Persian Gulf, Chernobyl), these declarations have assumed a programmed, sterile character.

When all three (or four) Summits are harmonized and well-managed, the result is usually success. In Tokyo, for example, the political Summit evoked strong agreement on an allied response to the Chernobyl disaster; the Summit of the Heads evolved into an exciting and groundbreaking discussion on the cost of agricultural subsidies. The Summit communique was consistent with the revived momentum on agricultural reform (Mrs. Thatcher actually drafted a part herself) and contained a new economic

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coordination initiative (the G-7) drafted by the Finance Ministers. Meanwhile, the media Summit was filled with images of allied agreement (Chernobyl), the economic dynamism of the Pacific Basin and new initiatives (agriculture and G-7 coordination) formulated by the U.S.

By contrast, Venice diverged into four separate and sometimes antithetical processes. The media was somehow led -- or by its own demands was deluded -- into expecting a declaration of allied unity (plus tangible support) for U.S. efforts in the Gulf. While the declaration on the Gulf achieved our immediate, more modest objectives (that led to more tangible Allied support later), the media created a situation where anything less than a commitment of naval vessels was viewed as a failure. That issue dominated the nightly news coverage for most of the Summit. A videotape check of network broadcasts during that period clearly demonstrates the point.

The economic accomplishments at Venice were modest and consisted of reaffirming commitments reached earlier at the OECD and the Bank/Fund meetings. No new progress was made on agriculture, for example, although the media was led to believe this was likely.

That perceived failure, in turn, revived the image of a crippled President (Iran Contra; waning years, etc.) incapable of retaining his leadership role in either foreign policy or economic matters.

The Summit-of-the-communicue meanwhile, though technically correct and reasonably positive, did not seem to correspond with the rhetorical promises made in the President's pre-Summit speeches. Secretary Baker, in his post-Summit briefing, did not even know about the Year 2000 plan on agriculture, announced by the President in his pre-Summit departure speech.

III. Response to Mulroney Letter

Better managing the Summit process as well as tighter USG internal coordination will be central to our ability to harmonize the "four Summit" tracks.

By internally strengthening and clarifying the roles of the two key Cabinet secretaries and by centralizing policy coordination through NSDD-297, we should expect in Toronto better USG performance.

Reform of the Summit process will be more difficult, both because of its increased bureaucratization and near ritualistic procedures. Often, when we have suggested change, we are usually met with Sherpa (spell b-u-r-e-a-u-c-r-a-c-y) rigidity.

Mulroney's letter does provide us with a window, however. The host country has a strong say in Summit tone, format and

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procedure. I recommend that the following points be communicated in the President's response to the Prime Minister:

-- Back to basics -- return to the original purpose of the Summit (economic), with an important place for informality and personal exchange.

-- To that end, suggest stronger role for the Finance Ministers at the Summit and in preparation therefore.

-- One communique at the end -- minimize the risk of separate political and economic Summits.

-- Meetings on economic issues first -- once completed, Finance Ministers and Sherpas closet themselves and draft communique.

-- Last day -- or dinner before last day -- meeting on political issues with Foreign Ministers.

-- No predrafts of communique. Sherpa preparation (meetings) should focus upon narrowing and presenting the issues, suggesting options and delivering same to their Heads immediately following the last Sherpa meeting in early June.

-- A session at mid-point in Summit where leaders could informally discuss broader economic issues: What sort of economic world will our successors be facing in the year 2010? What is the reality of interdependence and technology? Who will produce what? Where are the likely centers of economic power? What will be the role of government? Suggest that a think-piece be prepared by the Sherpas or outside experts (Drucker, George Shultz) to be read by all participants in advance of the meeting.

One final point. The political elements of the Toronto communique will be set by the outcomes of the NATO and Moscow Summits. However, as tempting as it may be, we will not be able to paper over lack of progress on economic issues solely by highlighting allied political unity. In the aftermath of NATO and Moscow, the press and markets will expect Heads to have equally serious discussion of pressing economic issues. The President's colleagues, all of whom will have active political agendas after Toronto, will probably want (and some may need) to match the substantive success of a political summit (NATO) with an economic summit.

IV. Public Relations

We know from our Venice experience that Summit public diplomacy needs to be well thought out and organized, especially in light of a heavy spring schedule of Presidential business and travel.

For several years, because White House staff did not have the time or manpower to plan and implement such a program, Ambassador

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Jim Rentschler of USIA was tapped for the job, working closely with White House "image makers" (Deaver) and spokespersons. Rentschler worked on Versailles, Bonn, London, Williamsburg and Tokyo. I recently spoke with Rentschler (who is now with the OECD Secretariat in Paris). He strongly recommended looking to the private sector for a public diplomacy strategist who could plan and direct the effort. Rentschler, despite his extensive knowledge of and affection for the present complement of USG public diplomacy experts, knew of no one within the government with the stature, imagination or experience to handle the responsibility. He suggested speaking with David Gergen and Les Daly.

Attachments

Tab 1

NSDD-297

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SYSTEM II
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DECLASSIFIED
Authority S. Tilley, NSC 10/31/90 THE WHITE HOUSE
BY COB NARA Date 6/24/92 WASHINGTON
January 20, 1988

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 297

PREPARATIONS FOR THE 1988 ECONOMIC SUMMIT (U)

This directive clarifies the responsibilities of various agencies in preparing for the 1988 Economic Summit meeting in Toronto. (U)

I. Preparations with Other Governments - "Sherpa" Team

I redesignate Allen Wallis, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, as my Personal Representative for the preparation of policy aspects of the Summit meeting. Together with Stephen Danzansky, Senior Director of the National Security Council's International Economic Affairs staff, and David Mulford, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, he will represent the U.S. Government at preparatory meetings for the Summit. (U)

II. Preparations within the U.S. Government

The President's Personal Representative will coordinate interagency preparation for the Economic Summit through appropriate groups at the Under Secretary level from the Vice President's office, the Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce, Defense, Agriculture, Energy, the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States Trade Representative, the National Security Council (NSC) staff, and the Council of Economic Advisors. He will coordinate the preparation of necessary briefing materials and U.S. participation in other international meetings where Summit issues are discussed. (U)

In carrying out his responsibilities for the Summit, the President's Personal Representative will report to the White House Summit Group (WHSG), co-chaired by the Chief of Staff to the President and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The WHSG will have primary responsibility for all matters relating to the Summit and will provide me with recommendations for decision. It may call upon the NSC and the Economic Policy Council for recommendations as necessary. (C)

The Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of State, who will be members of the WHSG, will have lead responsibility within the WHSG for coordinating economic issues and political issues respectively. The NSC's Senior Director of International Economic Affairs will be executive secretary of the WHSG. (U)

Ronald Reagan

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Key Elements of Proposed Response to Mulroney

- Back to basics; return to the original purpose of the Summit (economic), with an important place for informality and personal exchange.
- Start Summit with economic issues; once completed, Finance Ministers and Sherpas draft economic communique based on Heads' discussion.
- Heads then discuss political issues with Foreign Ministers.
- Issue economic communique and political statement (if any) at the end; minimize the risk of separate political and economic Summits.
- A session at mid-point in Summit where leaders could informally discuss broader economic issues.
- No predrafts of communique. Sherpa preparation (meetings) should focus upon narrowing and presenting the issues, suggesting options and delivering same to their Heads immediately following the last Sherpa meeting in early June.

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NLRR F97-06666 #192

BY RW NARA DATE 5/24/11

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Talking Points for Howard Baker

- First meeting of the WHSG to prepare for the Toronto Economic Summit. We want to use this group as the principal body to decide on our key objectives for Toronto and how best to achieve them. We will be meeting regularly and have officially added George and Jim. This will be the principal policy body for the Summit. It will be more than just the logistical command center that it was for the Venice Summit.
- Needless to say, this is the President's last Economic Summit; he has gone full circuit from his first Summit in Ottawa in 1981, and I believe he has just as important a legacy to leave on the economic front as he does in arms control.
- The President has signed the NSDD setting up this group. We talked through that document here in the White House and with you, Jim and George. Our objective is to make the process more efficient and less subject to policy divergence and surprise. To that end, you two have been appointed as members of the WHSG and are delegated the specific authority to manage policy: Jim on economic policy and George on political issues . . . beginning now and through the Summit.
- The NSDD lays out our internal organization. Allen Wallis will again be the President's Personal Representative; David Mulford and Steve Danzansky will be the other members of the

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BY RW NARA DATE 5/24

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Sherpa team. Steve will also act as the Executive Secretary of the White House Summit Group.

-- The Sherpa team has a lot of experience working together; we should be able to make the President's last Economic Summit both a personal and a policy success. The Sherpas will be working for us, the WHSG, and through us to the President.

-- Colin, do you have any thoughts on the structure at Toronto?

(after CLP remarks and discussion)

Concluding remarks

-- I believe it is traditional for the Sherpas to meet with the President before attending the first substantive meeting with their Sherpa colleagues from other countries. Purpose of the meeting is to get his blessing on the objectives we will pursue for Toronto.

-- I will be happy to arrange the meeting. But we should meet beforehand to review the objectives -- both political and economic.

-- Jim, will you work with the Sherpas to shape the economic objectives?

-- George, will you do the same on the political side, taking into account the NATO and Moscow Summits?

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By CCB NARA, Date 8/24/04

TORONTO ECONOMIC SUMMIT

June 19, 20, 21, 1988

OFFICIAL PROGRAM

SUNDAY, JUNE 19, 1988

0930 -

1300 hours

Official Welcomes
Nathan Phillips Square
Toronto City Hall

1500 -

1700 hours

Separate Sessions Heads - Economic Issues
Main meeting room of the
Toronto Convention Centre (MTCC)

1900 -

2100 hours

Separate dinners:

Dinner hosted by the Prime Minister of Canada
for Heads of Delegation
The Toronto Hunt (Political Issues)

Dinner hosted by the Secretary of State for
External Affairs for Foreign Ministers
The Faculty Club
University of Toronto

Dinner hosted by the Minister of Finance for
Finance Ministers
The Old Mill

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TUESDAY, JUNE 21, 1988

0930 -
1130 hours Plenary Session (Communique Review)
 Main Meeting Room, MTCC

1230 -
1430 hours Luncheon hosted by Her Excellency the Governor
 General of Canada for Heads of Delegation,
 Foreign Ministers, Finance Ministers and spouses
 Art Gallery of Ontario

1530 -
1600 hours Presentation of the Communique
 Roy Thomson Hall

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SYSTEM II
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THE WHITE HOUSE

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997


WASHINGTON

By 603 NARA, Date 8/24/04

January 19, 1988

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: COLIN L. POWELL 

SUBJECT: National Security Decision Directive on
1988 Toronto Economic Summit

Issue

Whether to sign the attached NSDD (Tab A) setting out directions on preparations for the 1988 Economic Summit in Toronto.

Facts

The 1988 Economic Summit will be held in Toronto June 19-21. The attached NSDD (Tab A) redesignates the same team of "Sherpas" which served you for the Tokyo and Venice Summits: Allen Wallis, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs as your Personal Representative, as well as Stephen Danzansky of the NSC and David Mulford of Treasury. The Sherpas would coordinate the preparation of U.S. Government positions for the Summit, overseen by a White House Summit Group, co-chaired by Howard Baker and myself, and including this year Jim Baker and George Shultz.

Discussion

Canada will host the first substantive meeting of Personal Representatives in February. Approval of the attached NSDD is sought at this time in order that the Sherpa team can begin preparations for the meeting.

In accordance with NSDD-266, Nicholas Rostow, Legal Adviser to the NSC, has coordinated this NSDD with A. B. Culvahouse in advance of its submission to you.

Recommendation

OK No

That you sign the attached NSDD designating the "Sherpa" team for the Toronto Economic Summit and setting forth the process for preparations for the Summit.

Attachment
Tab A NSDD

Prepared by:
Eric Melby

cc Vice President
Chief of Staff (2)

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SYSTEM II
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THE WHITE HOUSE

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: S. Tilley, NSC 10/31/90 WASHINGTON
BY: FDB NARA, Date: 8/21/04

PREPARATIONS FOR THE 1988 ECONOMIC SUMMIT (U)

This directive clarifies the responsibilities of various agencies in preparing for the 1988 Economic Summit meeting in Toronto. (U)

I. Preparations with Other Governments - "Sherpa" Team

I redesignate Allen Wallis, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, as my Personal Representative for the preparation of policy aspects of the Summit meeting. Together with Stephen Danzansky, Senior Director of the National Security Council's International Economic Affairs staff, and David Mulford, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, he will represent the U.S. Government at preparatory meetings for the Summit. (U)

II. Preparations within the U.S. Government

The President's Personal Representative will coordinate interagency preparation for the Economic Summit through appropriate groups at the Under Secretary level from the Vice President's office, the Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce, Defense, Agriculture, Energy, the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States Trade Representative, the National Security Council (NSC) staff, and the Council of Economic Advisors. He will coordinate the preparation of necessary briefing materials and U.S. participation in other international meetings where Summit issues are discussed. (U)

In carrying out his responsibilities for the Summit, the President's Personal Representative will report to the White House Summit Group (WHSG), co-chaired by the Chief of Staff to the President and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The WHSG will have primary responsibility for all matters relating to the Summit and will provide me with recommendations for decision. It may call upon the NSC and the Economic Policy Council for recommendations as necessary. (C)

The Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of State, who will be members of the WHSG, will have lead responsibility within the WHSG for coordinating economic issues and political issues respectively. The NSC's Senior Director of International Economic Affairs will be executive secretary of the WHSG. (U)

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